Monday, January 16, 2017

SCOTUS to confront implication for immigration statute of Johnson vagueness ruling

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in Lynch v. Dimaya, which comes to the Justices as part of the aftermath of their big 2015 Armed Career Criminal Act vagueness ruling in Johnson v. United States.  Over at SCOTUSblog here, Kevin Johnson has this preview of the case. It starts this way:

The U.S government targets noncitizens with criminal convictions for removal from the United States.  These efforts have allowed President Barack Obama’s administration to deport approximately 2.5 million noncitizens during Obama’s eight years in office, more than any other president in American history.  On several recent occasions, the Supreme Court has found that the administration went too far and has set aside orders of removal of criminal offenders that it has found to be inconsistent with the immigration statute. For example, in Mellouli v. Lynch, in 2015, the court held that a state misdemeanor conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia did not justify removal.  In 2013, in Moncrieffe v. Holder, the justices found that a lawful permanent resident’s conviction for possession of a small amount of marijuana — now legal in many states — did not mandate removal.  Next week, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Lynch v. Dimaya, another criminal-removal case, but one with potentially far-reaching constitutional implications.

A noncitizen, including a lawful permanent resident, who is convicted of an “aggravated felony” is subject to mandatory removal.  The Immigration and Nationality Act defines “aggravated felonies” expansively to include crimes, including some misdemeanors, that run the gamut from murder to virtually any drug and firearm offense.  That definition incorporates 18 U.S.C. §16(b), known as the “residual clause,” which defines a “crime of violence” to encompass “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”

In 2015, in Johnson v. United States, the court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, struck down as unconstitutionally vague the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “violent felony,” which included crimes that “involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  The Johnson court held that the statutory language “fail[ed] to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, [and was] so standardless that it invite[d] arbitrary enforcement.”

Born in the Philippines, James Garcia Dimaya has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1992.  Based on Dimaya’s two California burglary convictions, the U.S. government sought to remove him from the United States.  Finding that burglary was a “crime of violence” under Section 16(b)’s residual clause and thus an “aggravated felony,” an immigration judge ordered Dimaya removed.  The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed.  In a rare decision finding a removal provision of the U.S. immigration laws to be unconstitutional, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit concluded that Section 16(b) was void for vagueness.

January 16, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

After reviewing tens of thousands of requests, Obama Administration reportedly finds a few hundred more prisoners worthy of clemency

Anyone hoping Prez Obama would go out of office this week with a huge clemency bang will likely be disappointed to see this new Washington Post report headlined "Obama to commute hundreds of federal drug sentences in final grants of clemency."  I have been assuming Obama would make news with a few hundred more grants, but I know some advocates were hoping there would be perhaps thousands of commutations as Obama heads for the Oval Office exit.  Here instead is what we can expect after seemingly a whole lot of work by a whole lot of lawyers and DOJ officials:

Justice Department officials have completed their review of more than 16,000 clemency petitions filed by federal prisoners over the past two years and sent their last recommendations to President Obama, who is set to grant hundreds more commutations to nonviolent drug offenders during his final days in office.

“Everyone has killed themselves here to get the final recommendations to the president,” Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates said in an interview. “We were in overdrive. We were determined to live up to our commitment. It was 24-7 over the Christmas break.” U.S. Pardon Attorney Robert A. Zauzmer has not taken a day off since Yates brought him on in February 2016 to sift through the backlog of thousands of petitions. From her home in Atlanta, Yates said she reviewed hundreds of petitions during the holidays.

As President-elect Donald Trump prepares to take office, Justice officials worry that his administration will dismantle Obama’s clemency initiative, which has resulted in the early release of 1,176 drug offenders who were sentenced under the severe mandatory minimum laws passed in the 1980s and 1990s during the nation’s “war on drugs.” More than 400 were serving life sentences. Yates said Obama will grant “a significant” number of commutations this week, but would not specify a number. Several people close to the process said it will be several hundred.

Those officials also fear that the next attorney general may undo new criminal justice policies. Then-Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. put in place a policy three years ago to reserve the most severe drug-offense penalties for high-level or violent drug traffickers — and no longer charge low-level, nonviolent drug offenders with crimes that impose severe mandatory minimum sentences. Justice Department data indicate that prosecutors are now focusing on more-serious drug cases, and there have been fewer charges that carry mandatory sentences.

Neither Trump nor his attorney general-nominee, Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), has said what actions might be taken on drug charging policy or clemency, but during his campaign, Trump criticized Obama’s initiative to grant commutations. “Some of these people are bad dudes,” he said. “And these are people who are out, they’re walking the streets. Sleep tight, folks.”...

At several points during the past two years, it appeared that Obama’s clemency initiative might have been derailed, partly by a lack of resources but also by a cumbersome review process. After Holder and then-Deputy Attorney General James Cole began the effort in the spring of 2014, thousands of inmates applied. To help them with their petitions, outside lawyers formed an organization called Clemency Project 2014, which includes Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Bar Association and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

About 4,000 volunteer lawyers signed up to help in what has become one of the largest pro bono efforts in the history of the legal profession in the United States. Once the lawyers submitted the petitions, the U.S. pardon attorney made recommendations to the deputy attorney general, who reviewed the cases and sent them to the White House counsel, who also reviewed them before choosing which ones went to Obama.

When Yates arrived at Justice in the spring of 2015, the clemency program was overwhelmed and bogged down. Advocates criticized the inefficient process and urged the Obama administration to pick up the pace for the inmates waiting for relief from unfair sentences. “There wasn’t an apparatus set up,” Yates said. “When I arrived, they were doing the best they could . . . but we didn’t really have a playbook.”

Early last year, more than 9,000 clemency petitions were pending, and the pardon attorney at the time was so frustrated that she quit.  Yates brought on Zauzmer, a longtime federal prosecutor, who prioritized applications so that Justice lawyers could focus on inmates who met the criteria: Inmates had to have served at least 10 years; had no significant criminal history; no connection to gangs, cartels or organized crime; and probably would have received a “substantially lower sentence” if convicted today.

“These are big decisions that you’re making,” Yates said, alluding to the public-safety risks and the need to provide a “sophisticated analysis” to the president. “If it’s to let someone out of prison early, earlier than what their original sentence was, you’ve got to be careful about those decisions,” she said. “There’s lots of people whose current offense or conviction is a nonviolent drug offense . . . but you have to look at their past as well and at their criminal history.  You have to look at their conduct [in prison].”

Not all inmates who have been granted clemency will be released immediately or even in a number of months. Last summer, the Obama administration began granting clemency to some inmates by reducing their sentences; in some cases, they will remain in prison for years.  At the end of August, Yates announced that she would review and give Obama a recommendation on every petition from a drug offender that was still in the department’s possession at that time — about 6,195 petitions.  She did that, and included several hundred petitions received through Sept. 15, after her cutoff date.  She also reviewed petitions that came in as late as Nov. 30 from drug offenders serving life sentences. By last Friday, the final number of petitions reviewed was 16,776. “Sally deserves a lot of credit,” Holder said in an interview. “She set this goal of looking at every drug-clemency petition, and they accomplished that.”

I want to give DAG Yates and Pardon Attorney Zauzmer lots and lots of credit for all their efforts, and I will also give some credit to Prez Obama for ultimately making clemency an 11th hour priority.  But given that Prez Obama set of modern record for fewest clemencies during his first term in office, and especially because he leaves in place the same troublesome clemency process that has contributed to problems in the past, I will still look at Obama's tenure largely as an opportunity missed.  

January 16, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

"How the states can show the way: Participating in criminal justice reform, the states have saved over a billion dollars"

The title of this post is the headline given to this new Washington Times commentary authored by Marc Levin.  Here is how it gets started:

While the nation is still waiting to see if Congress will take up criminal justice reform, states have been quietly getting the job done. A new Urban Institute report shows that states participating in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) have saved over a billion dollars thus far through smart reforms to sentencing laws, pretrial practices, and prison release policies. Moreover, this has enhanced public safety.

It’s a direction deserving of praise on both sides of the aisle. Reforms curb prison growth and relieve unsustainable costs for the states, while giving states the opportunity to reinvest funds into programs that will reduce crime and reoffending, such as community behavioral health treatment, and services for victims. And they have reinvested, at least $450 million so far.

Guided by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Pew Charitable Trusts, JRI catalyzes change in both process and policy through intensive technical support to bipartisan groups of key criminal justice players. Where states typically address criminal penalties on ad hoc basis, JRI brings together a task force of judges, prosecutors, victims’ advocates, and other stakeholders to analyze data about the state’s prison population and use it as the basis to collaboratively develop a comprehensive plan that will cut growth and reduce reoffending.  The policy reforms embrace accountability for both offenders and the justice system, better distinguishing between those who must be incarcerated due to the danger they pose to society and those who can be rehabilitated in the community.

Here in Texas, success with this type of criminal justice reform was part of what prompted broad investment in JRI.  Texas reforms have yielded an incredible $3 billion in savings and averted costs over almost 10 years, providing opportunities to reinvest hundreds of millions of dollars into treatment and diversion programs.  Among the most successful interventions that Texas expanded in its 2007 justice reinvestment plan were drug courts, which led to lower re-arrest rates and reincarceration rates while costing the state a fraction of the amount Texas spends on incarceration.

Alongside declines in imprisonment we see a decline in crime rate.  From 2010 to 2015 in the 10 states with the largest imprisonment declines, the crime rate fell an average of 14.4 percent, compared with 8.1 percent in the 10 states with the biggest growth in imprisonment.  For example, the FBI index crime rate in South Carolina is now 15.7 percent lower than when the state’s justice reinvestment plan was adopted in 2010.  Similarly, Texas’ crime rate has fallen 30 percent since its 2007 justice reinvestment plan.

January 16, 2017 in Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (0)

UCLA Prison Law & Policy Program launches Prison Law JD, a new listserv for connecting new folks to prisoners' rights lawyers.

I am pleased to be able to post this announcement I received via email from Professor Sharon Dolovich, who is the director of the UCLA Prison Law & Policy Program:

The UCLA Prison Law & Policy Program has just launched Prison Law JD, a new listserv designed for law students and young lawyers interested in prisoners’ rights.  It will be used to share job and fellowship announcements and other information of interest, and for discussion and mutual support.  There is already an active listserv connecting practicing prisoners’ rights lawyers around the country, which has enabled the building of a strong and supportive national community of people doing this work.  Prison Law JD aims to build out this community to include the next generation of prisoners’ rights advocates.

If you know any law students or young lawyers who might want to join, please invite them to contact Sharon Dolovich at dolovich @ law.ucla.edu.

January 16, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Questioning a new term of supervised release after Prez Obama commutes a life sentence

This new article at The Fix highlights an interesting legal issue that has arisen in the wake of Prez Obama's decision to commute a drug offenders life sentence.  Here are the particulars (with a few edits for keeping the legal terminology accurate):

When Jimmy Walden was granted clemency by President Obama, it was the happiest day of his life.  Walden was locked up on May 19, 2008 and given a life sentence under federal sentencing guidelines for a very minor drug offense in Tennessee.  On August 4, 2016, Walden received an Executive Grant of Clemency commuting his total trial sentence of imprisonment to expire on August 3, 2018.  He was ecstatic, but then he got a letter from the court informing him that they wanted to impose a 10-year term of supervised release. The court hadn’t deemed it necessary at the time due to Walden’s life sentence, but since he was getting out, his judge now wanted to impose [supervised release], which in effect is another sentence.

“I was arrested in September 2007.  My case was possession with attempt to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana,” Walden tells The Fix from Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup in Georgia. “They arrested me and wanted me to tell. I refused and went to trial. They found me not guilty of count one and guilty of counts two to five.  They gave me life from enhancing me because of my priors.”

The two priors were for very small amounts of crack. Walden got caught with 1.3 grams the first time and .5 grams the second time. He was charged with possession with intent to sell. He was sentenced to probation in both cases.  But the federal government used those two priors to trigger the career criminal statute and sentenced Walden to life. He was effectively doing life for around 50 grams of crack cocaine.  That’s why Obama pardoned him, because he was serving a disproportionate sentence....

But at the same time he was getting congratulated on his presidential commutation, he received a disconcerting letter from the sentencing court saying that even though his judge omitted to sentence him to [supervised release] at his original sentencing, the judge now wanted to impose a term of supervised release on Walden once he was released. The judge went back and did a re-do, issuing an order that would amend a judgement that was final nine years ago. If Walden tried to get back in court on some issue and change his sentence, he’d be time barred by the court — but it seems the court can do as it pleases when it comes to drug war prisoners, while those unjustly incarcerated must follow the rules....

For some clarity on the matter, The Fix reached out to some clemency experts — P.S. Ruckman Jr., a professor of political science who runs the Pardon Power blog, and Margaret Love, the former pardon attorney under former President Bill Clinton — to get their opinions on the legalities involved with pardons and what the courts can or can’t do in this situation. “The president has the power to grant commutations of sentence, with or without conditions,” Ruckman tells The Fix....  “Presidents have commuted sentences on the condition that prisoners never drink again, that they live with their parents, that they leave D.C., that they join the army, that they leave the United States and never return, etc. In the past, prisoners have refused attached conditions and chosen to remain in prison.  My understanding is that this was a conditional pardon.”

If 10 years [supervised release] was one of the conditions of clemency like attending the Bureau of Prisons’ Residential Drug Abuse Program was then Walden has to accept it as part of the clemency grant or stay in prison like Ruckman said. No one would do that, but if the 10 years supervised release wasn’t a condition of the grant of clemency, then the court shouldn’t have any right to impose it. That would be illegal.

“I understand that the president’s commutation order did not mention a term of supervised release,” Margaret Love tells The Fix. “In any case, the pardon power does not authorize the president to impose a new sentence (which is what a term of supervised release is). The court's power to amend the original judgment to impose a new sentence of supervised release at this point, or to impose any conditions on his release, seems highly doubtful. At this point the court has no power to impose a term of supervised release, effectively a new sentence.”...

Pursuant to Rule 36, the court sent notice to Walden that it intends to amend the Judgment and Commitment Order to correct the Court's omission of failing to impose mandatory terms of supervised release as required by the statute. The court intends to order that all terms of supervised release run concurrently for a net effective term of 10 years of supervised release. The court also intends to impose the Standards Conditions of Supervision that have been adopted by his Court. The court appointed a public defender and informed Walden that he could object to the imposition of the term of supervised release.

“I objected,” Walden says.  “The point is I have remained in zero trouble inside prison. The president gave me clemency because he believed in me.  The judge now wants to add 10 years supervised release onto my sentence after my sentence has been final for over nine years. This is a violation of due process. As an inmate I have no legal way to get back into court. They had their chance at sentencing.  I disagree with this reasoning and I have filed a statement that I object to this addition with my attorney.  This is an interesting situation. Many people seem interested in the outcome.  It is illegal and should be brought to the public's attention.”

Even Walden’s public defender wasn’t sure about the legalities involved in this case, “I am currently reaching out to defenders across the nation to see if they have input on whether this is permissible post-grant of clemency,” she wrote him. Currently the public defender is in the process of making a supplement to the objections that Walden has. Plus other prisoners who received clemency grants from Obama have not received letters from their judge and court attempting to amend a judgment that is already final. Walden is ready to get on with his life without [supervised release] hovering over his head.

“I would like to drive trucks after getting my CDL license,” Walden says. “I thank God for another chance. I have this desire to drive trucks and see the country at the same time. Perhaps I will have a chance to speak to younger people and explain to them how unwise choices have consequences. I can stop youth from making the same mistakes I have. I am blessed that Obama came into office and helped me, or I’d be just another number serving life behind bars. There may not always be a President Obama around to give people another chance. I will definitely take the opportunity to prove to people like the President-elect that some people are deserving of a second chance.  I would certainly not want to mess up someone down the line from getting the same relief as me.”

The legal issue here strikes me as an interesting mix of functionalities and technicalities.  There was, of course, no functional reason for the sentencing judge to impose any term of supervised release at initial sentencing when imposing an LWOP sentence. But now that a commutation has resulted in an offender getting released after serving less than a decade, there now is a functional reason for imposing at least some SR term (which would have been a required part of the sentence had the defendant been sentenced to less than LWOP).  But, technically, I think there is a forceful argument that if the Prez did not include the addition of an SR term in his clemency grant, then it is improper for the original sentencing judge to now add that on to the defendant's original (now commuted) sentence.

Notably, the White House clemency page reports that the "1,176 men and women" who have had their prison sentences commuted by Prez Obama includes "395 individuals who were serving life sentences." Thus there are literally hundreds of individuals who could have this kind of post-commutation issue arise (although I doubt all sentencing courts are going to be as proactive as the court that added 10 years of supervised release to Walden's sentence).

January 16, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15)

"Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by A. Mitchell Polinsky now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This article considers the social desirability of prison work programs in a model in which the function of imprisonment is to deter crime.  Two types of prison work programs are studied — voluntary ones and mandatory ones.  A voluntary work program is socially beneficial: if prisoners are paid a wage that just compensates them for their disutility from work, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence is unaffected, but society obtains the product of the work program.  But a mandatory work program is superior to a voluntary work program: if prisoners are forced to work without compensation, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence rises, allowing society to restore deterrence and save resources by reducing the probability of detection or the sentence length, and also to obtain greater output than under the optimal voluntary work program.  In an extension of the basic analysis, however, in which prisoners vary in their disutility from work, a voluntary work program may be superior to a mandatory work program because prisoners with relatively high disutility from work can elect not to work.

January 16, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 15, 2017

Nebraska Supreme Court decides "undocumented status" can be proper, but not conclusive, sentencing factor when deciding on probation sentence

As reported in this local article, headlined "Immigration status can be used to help decide sentencing, Nebraska Supreme Court says," the top court in the Cornhusker State handed down an interesting ruling late last week. Here is the effective press summary of the decision:

A person’s immigration status can be considered when deciding if someone should be sentenced to probation rather than jail, though it cannot be the sole factor, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled Friday. It was the first time the state’s highest court has weighed in on the issue of whether criminal defendants can be denied probation solely because they are in the country illegally.

Jose Cerritos-Valdez had appealed after being sentenced to 230 days in jail and a $500 fine for two misdemeanors, attempted possession of a controlled substance and driving under the influence. His driving privileges were revoked for one year.

During sentencing, Sarpy County District Judge David Arterburn expressed reluctance to sentence Cerritos-Valdez to probation. One condition of probation is to obey all laws, and to do that, the judge said, would require Cerritos-Valdez to leave the country, because he was in the United States illegally. Arterburn also said he’d like to get some guidance on the issue from a higher court.

The Supreme Court’s ruling, written by Judge Stephanie Stacy, said that while this is an unsettled area of law, a consensus has formed in other courts that defendants cannot be denied probation solely because they are in the country illegally.

The full ruling in Nebraska v. Cerritos-Valdez is available at this link, and here is the heart of the court's nuanced analysis (with footnotes/cites removed):

This case presents the narrow question of whether a defendant’s undocumented status is a relevant consideration when determining whether to grant or deny probation.  We have not previously considered this question, but other courts have.  

While the law in this area is not well settled, a consensus has developed that it is impermissible for a sentencing court to deny probation based solely on a defendant’s undocumented status.  Beyond that broad proposition, courts differ on when, or for what purpose, a sentencing judge may properly consider a defendant’s undocumented status when deciding whether to impose probation.

Generally, in discussing whether it was proper to consider a defendant’s undocumented status in connection with deciding whether to impose a sentence of probation, other courts have focused on whether the defendant’s status implicated other relevant sentencing considerations.  For instance, some courts have held it is appropriate to consider the effect of a defendant’s undocumented status on his or her ability or willingness to comply with conditions of probation.  Other courts have reasoned that a defendant’s undocumented status or a history of repeated illegal reentry into the U.S. may demonstrate an “unwillingness to conform his or her conduct to the conditions of probation” or show that a probation sentence would not “be at all effective” for that defendant.  Still others have held that the undocumented status of defendants may be considered as it relates to their criminal history.  At least one court has noted that a defendant’s undocumented status is properly considered as it relates to the defendant’s employment history or legal employability.  And we note that in some instances, defendants have specifically asked the sentencing court to consider their undocumented status, arguing it would be error not to consider it.

Based on the foregoing, we agree that a defendant’s status as an undocumented immigrant cannot be the sole factor on which a court relies when determining whether to grant or deny probation; however, a sentencing court need not ignore a defendant’s undocumented status.  When deciding whether to grant probation, a defendant’s undocumented status may properly be considered by a sentencing court as one of many factors so long as it is either relevant to the offense for which sentence is being imposed, relevant to consideration of any of the required sentencing factors under Nebraska law, or relevant to the defendant’s ability or willingness to comply with recommended probation conditions.

January 15, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, January 14, 2017

"Punishment and Moral Risk"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new paper authored by Adam Kolber now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

For every interesting moral question, we should have at least some doubt that we know the right answer.  Legal theorists ignore this moral uncertainty at their peril.  To take one important example, for retributivists to inflict punishment, they must believe not only that a defendant is guilty but that all other prerequisites for deserved punishment are satisfied as well.  They must believe offenders have free will, even though philosophers have debated the topic for centuries.  They must believe offenders can be punished proportionally, even though no one has convincingly determined how to assess proportionality. And they must believe it appropriate to make offenders suffer as a response to the suffering they caused, even though some find this view barbaric.

These retributivist commitments, along with several others, are clearly controversial.  One would be hard-pressed to believe a single one — let alone the conjunction — with the 95% or 99% confidence frequently attributed to the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard used to assess guilt.  Reasonable retributivists, I argue, face too much uncertainty to justify punishment under the standard of proof they would likely set for themselves.  Consequentialists, by contrast, are less vulnerable to this challenge.  They can accept greater risk when punishing because they face countervailing risk by failing to adequately punish.

More generally, I argue that we hold not just beliefs but “portfolios of beliefs” that can exacerbate or hedge moral risks.  These portfolios sometimes do a better job of explaining our moral and legal views than existing theories, and I show how “epistemic hybrid” theories that combine retributivism and consequentialism can avoid the inconsistencies facing current hybrid theories.  We are not necessarily retributivists or consequentialists but, say, 60%-retributivists or 90%-consequentialists.  Portfolios of beliefs can also help us understand other areas of law and morality, such as the perplexities of threshold deontology and the puzzles of tort law.  Indeed, portfolios of beliefs may not only explain our beliefs but also offer normatively appealing alternatives to our existing theories that fail to take moral risk into account.

January 14, 2017 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, January 13, 2017

Supreme Court grants cert on four new criminal cases and a dozen others

After a seemingly long quiet period of avoiding taking on too many new cases, the Supreme Court this afternoon issued this order list which grants cert on 16(!) new cases.  I believe these four cases from the list are the only criminal ones, with links to case pages and descriptions via SCOTUSblog:

WEAVER, KENTEL M. V. MASSACHUSETTS: Whether a defendant asserting ineffective assistance that results in a structural error must, in addition to demonstrating deficient performance, show that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, as held by four circuits and five state courts of last resort; or whether prejudice is presumed in such cases, as held by four other circuits and two state high courts.

MASLENJAK, DIVNA V. UNITED STATES: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit erred by holding, in direct conflict with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 4th, 7th and 9th Circuits, that a naturalized American citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement.

McWILLIAMS, JAMES E. V. DUNN, COMM'R, AL DOC, ET AL.:  Whether, when this court held in Ake v. Oklahoma that an indigent defendant is entitled to meaningful expert assistance for the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense,” it clearly established that the expert should be independent of the prosecution.

DAVILA, ERICK D. V. DAVIS, DIR., TX DCJ : Whether the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, that ineffective state habeas counsel can be seen as cause to overcome the procedural default of a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, also applies to procedurally defaulted, but substantial, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.

Most of these cases look intricate, and maybe Maslenjak could even be viewed as a kind of sentencing case. But, on first look, I see no brewing blockbusters.

UPDATE: Over at Crime & Consequences here, Kent Scheidegger shares some initial reactions to this quartet of new SCOTUS criminal cases.

January 13, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15)

Long-serving US Attorney expected to be named for key Deputy Attorney General position in Justice Department

Usa_rosenstein_fullAs reported here by CNN, "President-elect Donald Trump is expected to nominate Baltimore US Attorney Rod Rosenstein for deputy attorney general, according to people close to the Trump transition." Here is more:

Rosenstein is the longest serving US attorney at the Justice Department, having won unanimous Senate confirmation to his current post in 2005 under the administration of President George W. Bush.  He's well-regarded in the department and stayed on as the top federal prosecutor in Baltimore under the Obama administration.  The then-Democratic-controlled Senate refused to confirm his 2007 nomination to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Trump has allowed his Cabinet nominees to play a major role in helping fill top positions in their agencies, a strategy past administrations haven't always followed.  Sessions, a former US attorney in Alabama, helped choose Rosenstein, transition officials say, in part because of his deep ties to the Justice Department.  Despite initial objections by Democrats, Sessions is expected to easily win confirmation.

The deputy attorney general leads day-to-day management of the 111,000 employees of the Justice Department.  Sessions has plans to make violent crime reduction a major part of his focus. In Baltimore, Rosenstein has pursued strategies to use federal agencies including the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives to help local authorities tackle high crime rates.

It is my understanding that the Deputy AG typically has even more hands-on impact on criminal justice policies and practices than does the AG, and thus folks especially interested or concerned about future DOJ sentencing reform efforts ought to be taking a close look at Rosenstein.  This profile of Rosenstein from 2011 in the Washington Post paints a favorable picture, and his history working in the last two Democratic Administration's lead me to be optimistic that Rosenstein may be the perfect persons to help shepherd bipartisan sentencing reforms efforts through Congress.

January 13, 2017 in Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

New ACLU report details unique harms of solitary confinement for prisoners with physical disabilities

The American Civil Liberties Union has released this big report to spotlight particular problems for a particular prison population subject to solitary confinement.  The ACLU report is titled "Caged In: Solitary Confinement's Devastating Harm on Prisoner's With Physical Disabilities," and here is how the report is summarized at this webpage:

This report provides a first-ever national ACLU account of the suffering prisoners with physical disabilities experience in solitary confinement.  It spotlights the dangers for blind people, Deaf people, people who are unable to walk without assistance, and people with other physical disabilities who are being held in small cells for 22 hours a day or longer, for days, months, and even years.  Solitary confinement is a punishing environment that endangers the well-being of people with physical disabilities and often violates the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The report’s revelations about the particular harms of solitary on people with physical disabilities shows the urgent need for far better accounting of the problems they face and the development of solutions to those problems.

January 13, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, January 12, 2017

"Mistakes and Justice — Using the Pardon Power to Remedy a Mistake of Law"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Paul Larkin now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

American criminal law has never recognized a mistake-of-law defense. The principal rationale for rejecting it has been that the community knows what the criminal law prohibits.  That may have been a reasonable rule when there were only a handful of crimes, and each one also violated the contemporary moral code, but that rule makes no sense today, given the use of the criminal law to enforce thousands of sometimes technical, arcane administrative regulations.  Clemency, however, may be a perfect vehicle for the implementation of a mistake- or ignorance-of-the-law defense.

Throughout Anglo-American legal history, kings, presidents, and governors have used their pardon power as a vehicle to remedy injustices in the criminal justice system.  The conviction of a person for conduct that no reasonable person would have thought to be a crime certainly qualifies as a miscarriage of justice.  Presidents and governors should consider using their clemency authority to pardon legitimate cases of mistake or ignorance, which might particularly arise in connection with strict criminal liability or regulatory crimes.

January 12, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

New report spotlights five Florida counties often condemning to death murderers have mental impairments

A few weeks ago, as noted in this prior post, Harvard Law School's Fair Punishment Project (FPP) released a report detailing and lamenting the composition of Oregon's death row under the title "Oregon’s Death Penalty Disproportionately Used Against Persons with Significant Mental Impairments."  Today, FPP has this new report bringing a similar analysis and criticism to a portion of a different state.  This new report is titled "Death Penalty Disproportionately Used Against Persons with Significant Mental Impairments in Five Florida Counties,"  and here are excerpts from the introduction:

The Florida Supreme Court recently held that the state’s capital punishment statute is unconstitutional. Approximately 380 people sentenced to death under the now-invalidated sentencing scheme remain on the death row. While litigation is still pending over whether the decision applies to all Florida death sentences, the Court has clarified that the approximately 150 people who were convicted after the Ring v. Arizona decision in 2002 must have their sentences reconsidered. Roughly one-third of these individuals convicted since 2002 come from just five of Florida’s 67 counties: Duval, Miami-Dade, Hillsborough, Orange, and Pinellas.

This report examines the 48 invalidated death sentences from these five Florida counties. We examined legal pleadings and opinions, trial testimony, and media reports, and consulted with several legal experts in Florida who are familiar with the individuals on death row.

Our research revealed that 63 percent of these individuals exhibit signs of serious mental illness or intellectual impairment, endured devastatingly severe childhood trauma, or were not old enough to legally purchase alcohol at the time the offense occurred. The pervasiveness of these crippling impairments among Florida’s death row population is significant when evaluating whether the death penalty was the appropriate sentence. Although all murders are gruesome and deserving of serious sanction, the Constitution limits the death penalty to the most heinous murders. Even then, the Constitution and established Supreme Court doctrine have limited application of the death penalty to adults who exhibits mental and emotional functioning that is equal to or exceeds that of the typically developed adult. So, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, regardless of the severity of the crime, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon a juvenile or an intellectually disabled person, both classes of individuals who suffer from impaired mental and emotional capacity relative to typically developed adults. To do otherwise would be so disproportionate as to violate his or her “inherent dignity as a human being.”

January 12, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

New Jersey Supreme Court addresses Miller's application to all serious juve sentencings

As reported in this local article, the top court in the Garden State "ruled unanimously Wednesday to overhaul the way New Jersey judges sentence juveniles convicted in violent crimes that could keep them in prison until they are elderly or dead." Here is more from the press report on the opinion:

The state's highest court ruled 7-0 that judges must consider a number of factors -- including age, family environment, and peer pressure -- before issuing lengthy sentences to youths in serious cases. Peter Verniero, a former state Supreme Court justice and state attorney general, said this is "one of the most significant sentencing decisions" the court has made in "many years."

And in a rare move, the court also urged the New Jersey Legislature to revise the state's current law on juvenile sentencing to "avoid a potential constitutional challenge in the future," according to the decision, written by Chief Justice Stuart Rabner.

The decision is the result of appeals filed by a pair of men who were convicted separately of violent crimes years ago in Essex County when they were 17 and were sentenced to decades in prison. Ricky Zuber was convicted for his role in two gang rapes in 1981 and was sentenced to 110 years in prison. He would not have been eligible for parole for 55 years -- a time when he would be 72. James Comer was convicted of four armed robberies in 2000, including one where an accomplice shot and killed a victim. He would have become eligible for parole when he was 85 -- after having served 68 years.

Rabner wrote that judges in both cases did not take "age or related circumstances" into account when issuing the sentences. But, Rabner said, the U.S. Supreme Court has since "sent a clear message" that "children are different" from adults and that "youth and its attendant characteristics" must be considered when sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without parole.

"Because of their young age at the time of their crimes, both defendants can expect to spend more than a half century in jail before they may be released -- longer than the time served by some adults convicted of first-degree murder," Rabner wrote.

Rabner cited how in a 2012 decision called Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that judges presiding over cases involving juveniles facing life sentences without parole must consider a number of factors before sentencing. Those include immaturity; family and home environment; family and peer pressures; an"inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors" or their own attorney; and "the possibility of rehabilitation."

But New Jersey's Supreme Court went further, saying those standards must be applied not only to sentences of life without parole but also to youths who face lengthy sentences. The court also cited a the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which protects defendants from "cruel and unusual punishment."

"Youth matters under the constitution," Rabner wrote.

The full opinion is available at this link, and it covers a lot of important post-Graham and post-Miller ground concerning juvenile sentencing.

January 12, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 11, 2017

Texas completes first execution of 2017

As reported in this new AP piece, "Texas has executed death row inmate Christopher Wilkins, who was convicted of killing two men after one of them mocked him for falling for a phony drug deal."  Here is more:

The lethal injection of the 48-year-old Wilkins Wednesday is the nation’s first execution this year.  Twenty were carried out in the U.S. last year, the lowest number since the 1980s.  Wilkins explained to jurors at his capital murder trial in 2008 how and why he killed his friends in Fort Worth three years earlier, saying he didn’t care if they sentenced him to death.

The Supreme Court declined to block Wilkins’ execution about three hours before the scheduled lethal injection. Wilkins’ attorneys had argued to the Supreme Court that he had poor legal help at his trial and during earlier appeals and that the courts improperly refused to authorize money for a more thorough investigation of those claims to support other appeals and a clemency petition.

In their unsuccessful appeal to the high court, Wilkins’ attorneys contended he had poor legal help at trial and during earlier appeals and that the courts improperly refused to authorize money for a more thorough investigation of his claims.  State attorneys said courts have rejected similar appeals and that defense lawyers are simply employing delaying tactics.

Wilkins was released from prison in 2005 after serving time for a federal gun possession conviction. He drove a stolen truck to Fort Worth, where he befriended Willie Freeman, 40, and Mike Silva, 33.  Court records show Freeman and his drug supplier, who wasn’t identified, duped Wilkins into paying $20 for a piece of gravel that he thought was a rock of crack cocaine.  Wilkins said he shot Freeman on Oct. 28, 2005, after Freeman laughed about the scam, then he shot Silva because he was there. Wilkins’ fingerprints were found in Silva’s wrecked SUV and a pentagram matching one of Wilkins’ numerous tattoos had been carved into the hood.

Wilkins also testified that the day before the shootings, he shot and killed another man, Gilbert Vallejo, 47, outside a Fort Worth bar in a dispute over a pay phone, and about a week later used a stolen car to try to run down two people because he believed one of them had taken his sunglasses. “I know they are bad decisions,” Wilkins told jurors of his actions. “I make them anyway.”...

Twenty convicted killers were executed in the U.S. last year, the lowest number since the early 1980s. That tally includes seven executions in Texas — the fewest in the state since 1996.  Wilkins is among nine Texas inmates already scheduled to die in the early months of 2017.

January 11, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?"

The title of this post is the title of this provocative new article authored by William Baude and now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The doctrine of qualified immunity operates as an unwritten defense to civil rights lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It prevents plaintiffs from recovering damages for violations of their constitutional rights unless the government official violated “clearly established law,” usually requiring a specific precedent on point.  This article argues that the doctrine is unlawful and inconsistent with conventional principles of statutory interpretation.

Members of the Supreme Court have offered three different justifications for imposing such an unwritten defense on the text of Section 1983.  One is that it derives from a common law “good faith” defense; another is that it compensates for an earlier putative mistake in broadening the statute; the third is that it provides “fair warning” to government officials, akin to the rule of lenity.

But on closer examination, each of these justifications falls apart, for a mix of historical, conceptual, and doctrinal reasons.  There was no such defense; there was no such mistake; lenity ought not apply.  And even if these things were otherwise, the doctrine of qualified immunity would not be the best response.

The unlawfulness of qualified immunity is of particular importance now.  Despite the shoddy foundations, the Supreme Court has been reinforcing the doctrine of immunity in both formal and informal ways.  In particular, the Court has given qualified immunity a privileged place on its agenda reserved for few other legal doctrines besides habeas deference.  Rather than doubling down, the Court ought to be beating a retreat.

Though technically not a sentencing article, any conceptual and/or doctrinal strike against qualified immunity seems likely also to be a blow against the absolute immunity that right now protects from litigation scrutiny the sentencing decisions made by prosecutors and judges.

January 11, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Great political and practical "state of reform" reviews via Jacobin

ImagesThe magazine Jacobin has recently run two effective pieces by two effective writers about the politics and practicalities of modern sentencing reform efforts. Here are links to the lengthy pieces, both of which I recommend in full, with their introductions:

"Conservatives Against Incarceration?: Fiscal conservatives were never going to bring down the carceral state. A broader fight against social inequality is needed." by Marie Gottschalk

Many are mourning the death of comprehensive criminal justice reform at the federal level in the wake of the election of Donald Trump, who unabashedly campaigned as the law-and-order candidate. They fear we may be at the beginning of the end of the “smart-on-crime” era, in which historic adversaries across the political spectrum joined forces to reverse the punitive policies and politics that have turned the United States into the world’s leading warden.

Some have sought solace in the belief that Trump’s victory will have a limited impact because most people are apprehended, tried, and sentenced subject to state and local statutes and authorities, not federal ones, and that 90 percent of the more than 2 million people incarcerated today in the United States are serving their time in state prisons and county jails, not federal penitentiaries. They view Trump as a political meteorite that may have blown up the elite bipartisan reform coalition in Washington as it blazed through an uncharted political universe but left promising reform coalitions at the state and local levels largely intact.

This conventional postmortem paradoxically overestimates Trump’s responsibility for imperiling criminal justice reform at the national level while underestimating his likely impact on state and local reform efforts.

Trump’s outsized personality and spectacular victory obscure the reality that the smart-on-crime approach had severe limitations and weaknesses that have been hiding in plain sight for years. The politics that gave birth to this strange bedfellows coalition engineered by Right on Crime — a group of brand-name conservatives and libertarians that included Newt Gingrich, Grover Norquist, and Charles and David Koch — helps explain both its limited accomplishments and the triumph of Trumpism.

"America’s Durable Monstrosity: New figures show that the US prison population has dropped. But mass incarceration remains firmly intact." by Daniel Denvir

A ray of sunshine recently poked through the otherwise gloomy holiday headlines: “US prison population falling as crime rates stay low.”  The prison population has indeed fallen, and crime rates are still down.  But while the crime that politicians exploited to create mass incarceration has plummeted, the number of prisoners locked up in the name of public safety has only budged.

Mass incarceration, in short, remains a durable monstrosity.

As of 2015, an estimated 2,173,800 Americans were behind bars — 1,526,800 in prison and 728,200 in jails — according to recently released data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  That’s 16,400 fewer people in jail and 35,500 fewer prisoners than in 2014 — a 2.3 percent decline and, for prisoners, the largest single-year drop since 1978. The 2015 figure also marks the lowest overall prison population since 2005. Crime rates have plunged, falling “to levels not seen since the late 1960s.”

But even as the US becomes a much safer country, it still incarcerates its citizens at much higher rates than most any other on earth.  To put things in perspective, our prison archipelago today confines a population similar in size to the city of Houston or the borough of Queens.

At the dawn of mass incarceration in 1980, the US’s already-quite-large prison population was estimated at 329,821. To return to that number, the governments would have to replicate the recent 35,500-prisoner reduction for roughly thirty-four years in a row.  That’s a very long time to wait for the poor communities — particularly but not exclusively brown and black ones — that mass incarceration devastates.

The criminal justice reform movement has stopped losing. But it hasn’t really started to win.

January 11, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, January 10, 2017

Charleston Church shooter Dylann Roof sentencing to death by federal jury

As reported in this local article, only "a few hours after he told a crowded courtroom 'I still feel like I had to do it,' a federal jury sentenced Dylann Roof to death for carrying out a cold, calculated massacre inside Charleston's Emanuel AME Church in a bid to spark a race war." Here is more about an unsurprising verdict:

The 12-member panel – three white jurors, nine black – deliberated for a little less than three hours before unanimously deciding that the 22-year-old white supremacist should die for his crimes rather than spend his life in prison without the possibility of parole.

It will be up to the presiding judge to formally impose that sentence, but he is bound by law to follow the jury’s decision. U.S. District Judge Richard Gergel has scheduled the formal sentencing hearing for 9:30 a.m. Wednesday.

Roof, who sat stone-faced and silent through most of his hate crimes trial, betrayed no emotion as the jury’s verdict was read. During his closing argument earlier in the day, he passed on the chance to argue for his life, saying “I’m not sure what good that will do anyway.”

After the jury announced its verdict, Roof stood and asked the judge if he would appoint him new lawyers to help him file a request for a new trial. Gergel told Roof a significant amount has been spent on the current legal team that Roof sidelined for the trial's penalty phase, a team led by noted capital defense lawyer David Bruck. The judge said he would be "strongly disinclined" to bring in new lawyers at this point, but he will listen to any motions Roof wants to make during Wednesday's proceedings.

Earlier in the day, Roof told the jury that prosecutors don't understand him or the meaning of hate in their quest to put him to death for the June 2015 church massacre. “Anyone, including the prosecution, who thinks I am filled with hate has no idea what real hate is,” Roof said, speaking to jurors from a podium about eight feet away from the jury box. “They don’t know anything about hate."

After Assistant U.S. Attorney Jay Richardson delivered a two-hour closing statement, Roof walked to the podium with a single sheet of yellow notebook paper. He appeared to read from it, pausing at times to glance down. His remarks lasted less than five minutes.

January 10, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Interesting new report on impact of Prop 47 on drug arrests in California

Via email I received notice of this notable new research report, titled "Declinining Drug Enforcement After Proposition 47," coming from the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice and the Drug Policy Alliance. This executive summary provides the report's highlights:

In November 2014, California took a significant step toward reforming mass criminalization and over-incarceration by passing Proposition 47, a law that changed certain low-level crimes from potential felonies to misdemeanors, prioritizing drug treatment over punishment. Prop 47 reclassified three drug possession offenses (possession of a narcotic, concentrated cannabis, or a non-narcotic) and reinvested state savings in direct services. In 2015, the first full year after Prop 47, felony drug arrests fell by over 92,000 while misdemeanor drug arrests increased by only 70,000. Taken together, these shifts produced a 10 percent decline in total drug arrests.

In response to Prop 47’s reclassification statute, some law enforcement departments began redirecting drug enforcement resources to community policing or the enforcement of other, more serious, offenses. Critics of the policy, however, claim that it limits police authority and constrains the effectiveness of drug control, a contention that has led some law enforcement agencies to deemphasize the enforcement of Proposition 47-related offenses.

This report seeks to understand how enforcement and prosecution of drug possession offenses have changed after Prop 47 by analyzing arrests and citations made by Los Angeles and San Diego law enforcement, and charges filed by county prosecutors. Some of the findings include:

Prop 47 reduced inconsistencies in the classification of drug possession offenses as felonies or misdemeanors.  Prior to Prop 47, qualifying drug possession offenses could be prosecuted as misdemeanors, felonies, or “wobblers.” After the passage of Prop 47, these offenses are filed as misdemeanors, eliminating prosecutorial discretion and the presence of “justice-by-geography,” which can disproportionately impact low income communities and communities of color.

Drug arrests and citations were increasing in the years immediately preceding Prop 47.  From 2010-2014, arrests and citations for Prop 47 drug possession offenses increased in 72 percent of law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles and San Diego counties. Between 2014-2015, 58 percent of agencies reported declines.

Arrests and citations declined after Prop 47, but varied by county, city, and substance.  For example, while both San Diego and Los Angeles counties experienced declines in arrests and citations, Los Angles reported a decrease of 45 percent while San Diego reported 7 percent decline.

January 10, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

AG-nominee Jeff Sessions puts focus on crime in opening statement before confirmation hearing

Via Politico, here is the text of Attorney General nominee Jeff Sessions' full opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, as prepared for delivery.  And here are some excerpts that highlight its crime-fighting tone, as well as some of the effort to thwart certain criticisms already lodged against the nomination:

Protecting the people of this country from crime, and especially from violent crime, is the high calling of the men and women of the Department of Justice. Today, I am afraid, that has become more important than ever.

Since the early 1980s, good policing and prosecutions have been a strong force in reducing crime. Drug use and murders are half what they were in 1980. I am very concerned, however, that the recent jump in the violent crime and murder rates are not anomalies, but the beginning of a dangerous trend that could reverse the hard won gains that have made America a safer and more prosperous place. The latest official FBI statistics show that all crime increased nearly 4 percent from 2014 to 2015 with murders increasing nearly 11 percent — the largest single year increase since 1971. In 2016, there were 4,368 shooting victims in Chicago. In Baltimore, homicides reached the second highest per-capita rate ever.

The country is also in the throes of a heroin epidemic, with overdose deaths more than tripling between 2010 and 2014. Meanwhile, illegal drugs flood across our southern border and into every city and town in the country, bringing violence, addiction, and misery.

We must not lose perspective when discussing these statistics. We must always remember that these crimes are being committed against real people, real victims. It is important that they are kept in the forefront of our minds in these conversations, and to ensure that their rights are always protected.

These trends cannot continue. It is a fundamental civil right to be safe in your home and your community. If I am confirmed, we will systematically prosecute criminals who use guns in committing crimes. As United States Attorney, my office was a national leader in gun prosecutions every year. We will partner with state and local law enforcement to take down drug trafficking cartels and dismantle gangs. We will prosecute those who repeatedly violate our borders. It will be my priority to confront these crises vigorously, effectively, and immediately.

Approximately 90 percent of all law enforcement officers are not federal, but local and state. They are the ones on the front lines. They are better educated, trained and equipped than ever before. They are the ones who we rely on to keep our neighborhoods, and playgrounds, and schools safe. But in the last several years, law enforcement as a whole has been unfairly maligned and blamed for the actions of a few bad actors and for allegations about police that were not true. They believe the political leadership of this country abandoned them. They felt they had become targets. Morale has suffered. And last year, while under intense public criticism, the number of police officers killed in the line of duty increased ten percent over 2015. This is a wake up call. This must not continue.

If we are to be more effective in dealing with rising crime, we will have to rely heavily on local law enforcement to lead the way. To do that, they must know that they are supported. If I am so fortunate as to be confirmed as Attorney General, they can be assured that they will have my support.

As I discussed with many of you in our meetings prior to this hearing, the federal government has an important role to play in this area. We must use the research and expertise of the Department of Justice to help them in developing the most effective and lawful enforcement methods to reduce crime. We must re-establish and strengthen the partnership between federal and local officers to enhance a common and unified effort to reverse the current rising crime trends. I did this as United States Attorney. I worked directly and continuously with state and local law enforcement officials. If confirmed, it will be one of my primary objectives....

In recent years, our law enforcement officers also have been called upon to protect our country from the rising threat of terrorism that has reached our shores. If I am confirmed, protecting the American people from the scourge of radical Islamic terrorism will continue to be a top priority of the Department of Justice. We will work diligently to respond to threats, using all lawful means to keep the American people safe from our nation’s enemies. Partnerships will also be vital to achieving much more effective enforcement against cyber threats, and the Department of Justice clearly has a lead role to play in that essential effort. We must honestly assess our vulnerabilities and have a clear plan for defense, as well as offense, when it comes to America’s cybersecurity.

The Department of Justice must never falter in its obligation to protect the civil rights of every American, particularly those who are most vulnerable. A special priority for me in this regard will be aggressive enforcement of our laws to ensure access to the ballot for every eligible American voter, without hindrance or discrimination, and to ensure the integrity of the electoral process....

You can be absolutely sure that I understand the immense responsibility I would have. I am not naïve. I know the threat that our rising crime and addiction rates pose to the health and safety of our country. I know the threat of terrorism. I deeply understand the history of civil rights and the horrendous impact that relentless and systemic discrimination and the denial of voting rights has had on our African-American brothers and sisters. I have witnessed it. I understand the demands for justice and fairness made by the LGBT community. I understand the lifelong scars born by women who are victims of assault and abuse.

A few prior related posts on AG-nominee Sessions:

January 10, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)