Tuesday, September 18, 2018

The latest argument for "overhauling the [DEA], or even getting rid of it entirely."

Leo Beletsky and Jeremiah Goulka has this new New York Times commentary under the headline "The Federal Agency That Fuels the Opioid Crisis: The Drug Enforcement Administration has proved itself incompetent for decades."  Here is how it starts and ends:

Every day, nearly 200 people across the country die from drug overdoses.  Opioids have been the primary driver of this calamity: first as prescription painkillers, then heroin and, more recently, illicitly manufactured fentanyl.  The death toll has risen steadily over the past two decades.

The Drug Enforcement Administration, the agency that most directly oversees access to opioids, deserves much of the blame for these deaths.  Because of its incompetence, the opioid crisis has gone from bad to worse.  The solution: overhauling the agency, or even getting rid of it entirely.

The problem begins with poor design.  A brainchild of Richard Nixon’s “war on drugs,” the agency sought to cut off supplies of drugs on the black market, here and abroad. But in passing the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Congress also gave the agency broad authority over how prescription opioids and other controlled substances were classified, produced and distributed.  The agency was supposed to curb problematic drug use, but failed to do so because its tactics were never informed by public health or addiction science.

Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars and the earnest efforts of thousands of employees, the D.E.A.’s track record is abysmal. The agency has been unable to balance legitimate access to and control of prescription drugs.  The widespread over-reliance on opioids, along with benzodiazepines, amphetamines and other scheduled medications, has created a booming black market.

The agency’s enforcement strategies, and the support it has lent to local and state police departments, have also fueled abusive police tactics including dangerous no-knock-raids and ethnic profiling of drivers.  It has eroded civil liberties through the expansion of warrantless surveillance, and overseen arbitrary seizures of billions of dollars of private property without any clear connection to drug-related crimes.  These actions have disproportionately targeted people of color, contributing to disparities in mass incarceration, confiscated property, and collective trauma....

We urgently need to rethink how our nation regulates drugs.  What should our goals be?  How can we design institutions and performance metrics to achieve them?

The answers lie at the local and state levels.  In Rhode Island, opioid overdoses are declining because people behind bars have access to effective treatment. Massachusetts has deployed drop-in centers offering treatment, naloxone and other services.  San Francisco and Seattle are planning to open safe consumption spaces which show tremendous promise as a tool to reduce overdose deaths and other drug-related harm.  But the D.E.A. and its institutional parent, the Justice Department, stand in the way of some of these experiments.

We ought to reinvent the Drug Enforcement Administration. Considering its lack of public health and health care orientation, the agency’s regulatory authority over the pharmaceutical supply could be transferred to a strengthened and independent Food and Drug Administration, while the regulation of medical and pharmacy practice can be ceded to the states.  Parts of the D.E.A.’s law enforcement mandate should be transferred to the F.B.I., delegated back to the local or state, or eliminated.  A significant portion of the D.E.A.’s budget should be reinvested in lifesaving measures like access to high-quality treatment.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has had over 40 years to win the war on drugs.  Instead its tactics have fueled the opioid crisis.  To finally make a dent in this national emergency, we need to rethink the agency from the bottom up.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the suggestion to consider abolishing DEA is not novel. A quick google search turned up these other recent like-minded commentary (among others):

September 18, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Previewing the two capital punishment administration cases before SCOTUS this fall

Garrett Epps has this lengthy new commentary at The Atlantic under the headline "The Machinery of Death Is Back on the Docket: Two Supreme Court cases this fall pose hard questions about the death penalty." Here are some excerpts:

Madison v. Alabamato be argued on October 2, asks whether states can execute demented murderers who no longer remember their crimes; Bucklew v. Precythe asks when, if ever, a prisoner’s individual physical condition makes execution by lethal injection “cruel and unusual.”...

[Vernon] Madison’s legal team — led by Bryan Stevenson of the Equal Justice Initiative—argues that “No penological justification or retributive value can be found in executing a severely impaired and incompetent prisoner.” 

Alabama’s response is that the goals of capital punishment — retribution for the wrong and sending a warning to possible future offenders—are served as long as Madison knows why he is being executed, even if he doesn’t remember committing the acts. Madison’s particular condition may have been verified by doctors, the state argues, but dementia has many causes. Future claims of dementia and memory loss will be too easy to fake.

The high court has already held that states may not execute the mentally ill or the intellectually disabled; the leap to the demented would seem inevitable. But Justice Anthony Kennedy, the force behind these limits, has left the court, and death jurisprudence, as of the first Monday of next month, will likely be more volatile than usual.

In November, the court will take up the case of Russell Bucklew, whom the state of Missouri seeks to execute for the 1996 murder of Michael Sanders.... Bucklew doesn’t contest his guilt, nor does he claim that Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol is in itself “cruel and unusual.” His is what lawyers call an “as applied” challenge. What that means is this: Though lethal injection may pass muster for most executions, he argues, in his individual case, because of his unusual physical condition, the injection will cause him intense and intolerable pain.

He suffers from a rare medical condition call cavernous hemangioma. The condition has given rise to multiple blood-filled tumors in his head and mouth. These make it difficult to breathe and are prone to bloody rupture. He must sleep sitting up to avoid choking on his own blood. Being strapped flat to a gurney will subject him to suffocation, he argues. In addition, since his blood vessels are affected, he says, those administering the drugs will probably have to use a lengthy and painful procedure called a “cutdown” before the drugs can be administered, prolonging the agony....

Bucklew did offer an alternative already provided in Missouri law — a gas chamber filled with nitrogen gas, which would render him unconscious and then dead without the agony of suffocation.  The Eighth Circuit said that he did not prove the gas chamber would be better.  The court below had heard from two expert witnesses — one who described the agony of lethal injection and another who stated that gas would kill him more quickly.  A trial court could compare the two descriptions and reach its own conclusion about relative agony.  Not good enough, said the appeals court; Bucklew was required to provide one expert who would offer “comparative testimony” — in effect, a single witness to say that one method is less cruel than another....

The Bucklew case, however it is resolved, shows how fully the court has become enmeshed in the sordid details of official killing. As the population of death row ages, issues of age-related disease and dementia will become more important in assessing individual death warrants, and the court will be the last stop for those challenged.

The court seems likely to be hostile to prisoners’ claims, however.  In recent years, when the high court stepped in to halt executions, Justice Anthony Kennedy was usually the deciding vote. Kennedy will almost certainly be replaced by Brett Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh is formally an unknown on the issue. His conservatism in general, however, is orthodox, and conservative orthodoxy is hostile to new claims that executions are “cruel and unusual.”

September 18, 2018 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

"From Punishment to Public Health: Embracing Evidence-Based Solutions to End the Overdose Crisis"

The title of this post is the title of this exciting event taking place at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law in Columbus, Ohio at the end of next week. OSU's newly established Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC) is co-hosting this two-day gathering, and here is the conference description from the full conference agenda:

This conference aims to explore the impact of criminal justice laws and policies in compounding drug use harms, including overdose deaths, and offer an alternative framework for addressing problematic drug use and drug-related fatalities that is rooted in evidence, compassion, and the principles of harm reduction.

The country is in the middle of a tragic increase in drug overdose deaths and Ohio is at the epicenter of the overdose crisis. According to new preliminary estimates for 2017 from the Center for Disease Control, the country has suffered a record 72,000 overdose deaths, with Ohio’s rate of overdose deaths increasing by more than 17%.  In 2016, Ohio ranked second in the nation in drug overdose death rates (at 39.1 per 100,000) and third in the nation in total number of deaths (4,329).  Ohio is losing nearly 12 citizens each day to a drug overdose.

Responses to the overdose crisis across the nation and within the state have been mixed.  There has been a renewed emphasis on treatment, expanded access to the overdose antidote naloxone, and the passage of Good Samaritan laws that offer protection to those calling for help during an overdose. Health officials in Ohio are even engaging in serious discussions of previously-taboo harm reduction interventions, such as drug checking strips.  Nonetheless, use of the criminal justice system continues to dominate local, state, and federal responses to increasing rates of opioid use and overdose. Ohio, for instance, charges more people with manslaughter for delivery of a controlled substance resulting in death than any other state except one.  Local and state elected officials have proposed legislation that would increase penalties for fentanyl, create a specific drug-induced homicide offense, and refuse medical assistance after a third overdose.  Resources for supply side interventions are dwarfing those dedicated to evidence-based interventions like community-based naloxone or syringe exchange.

In this conference hosted by the Drug Policy Alliance, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, Harm Reduction Ohio, and ACLU-Ohio along with partners Harm Reduction Coalition, The Ohio Alliance for Innovation in Population Health and the Ohio State College of Public Health, we will explore why a public health approach to problematic drug use and overdose is critical to reducing needless deaths and other harms and why punitive measures can be counterproductive and destructive. Local, national, and international expert panelists will articulate why and how we can reverse course in our response to the overdose crisis by embracing and applying evidence and the principles of harm reduction rather than principles of punishment.  In so doing, panelists will also dispel common myths about what is effective and what is not based on research, science, and experience.

More details about and registration for this event are available here and here.

September 18, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 17, 2018

SCOTUS preview guest post: "Strange Bedfellows at the Supreme Court"

Guest-postsI am very grateful that Wayne Logan, the Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law at Florida State University and the author of Knowledge as Power: Criminal Registration and Community Notification Laws in America (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009), reached out to offer me an original commentary on a case to be heard by the Supreme Court next month.  Here it is:

Herman Gundy, convicted of providing cocaine to a young girl and raping her, is a decidedly unlikely emissary in conservatives’ campaign to dismantle the administrative state.  In Gundy v. United States, to be argued the first week of the Supreme Court’s coming term, the Justices will address whether Congress violated the “non-delegation doctrine” when it directed the U.S. Attorney General to decide whether the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) should apply to individuals convicted before its 2006 enactment.  Gundy, whose rape conviction was in 2005, has a dog in the fight because the attorney general made SORNA retroactive, and Gundy was convicted of a felony under SORNA after he traveled interstate in 2012 without informing authorities.

The Court’s decision to hear Gundy’s case came as a major surprise.  The Justices have not invalidated a congressional delegation in over eighty years and all eleven federal appellate courts addressing the issue have concluded that the delegation was proper.  At least four Justices, the number needed to grant certiorari, however, thought the issue worth considering, clearing the way for a potential major assault on the modern administrative state, which is shaped by countless congressional delegations of authority to agencies.

If this occurs, it would be ironic.  Conservatives usually tout people like Gundy as poster boys for tough-on-crime policies, such as SORNA, which was enacted by a Republication Congress, signed into law by Republican President George W. Bush, and made retroactive by his attorney general (Alberto Gonzales).  Meanwhile, liberals, often fans of the administrative state, in areas such as environmental protection and workplace safety, tend to voice concern over such heavy-handed criminal justice initiatives.

On the merits, Gundy appears to have a strong claim.  For a delegation to be proper, Congress must provide an “intelligible principle” to guide the delegated decision, which as Chief Justice John Marshall stated in 1825 should merely “fill up the details” of a law’s application.  With SORNA, Congress simply directed the attorney general to decide the retroactivity question — hardly a detail, as it affected half a million people and has required significant federal prosecutorial resources.

Whether SORNA should apply retroactively is the kind of basic policy question that democratically accountable members of Congress should decide.  But they punted, for obvious political reasons.  The House and Senate could not agree on retroactivity and, when states later provided the attorney general input on SORNA’s possible retroactivity to their own registries, many vigorously objected to retroactivity.

Regardless of whether registration and notification actually promote public safety, which research has cast doubt upon, federal policy on the issue has long been marked by overreach.  Since 1994, when Congress first began threatening states with loss of federal funds unless they followed its directives, federal involvement has rightly been viewed as both foisting unfunded mandates upon states and a ham-fisted effort to policy-make in an area of undisputed state prerogative: criminal justice policy.

When Gundy is argued and decided Justice Neil Gorsuch will likely play a key role.  As a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Gorsuch wrote a lengthy dissent from his colleagues’ refusal to reconsider en banc their decision that the SORNA delegation was proper.  Gorsuch advocated a requirement of heightened guidance in criminal justice delegations, justified by the unique “intrusions on personal liberty” and stigma of convictions.  There is considerable appeal to Justice Gorsuch’s view, which the Court itself suggested in 1991.  Moreover, unlike other policy areas, such as environmental quality and drug safety, criminal justice typically does not require scientific or technical expertise, lessening the practical need for delegations in the first instance.

Ultimately, the Court might conclude, with justification, that the SORNA delegation was invalid because it lacked any “intelligible principle.”  On the other extreme, as Justice Thomas might well urge, the Court could outlaw delegations altogether.  Chief Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justice Alito, recently condemned the “vast power” of the administrative state, and Court nominee Judge Brett Kavanaugh has signaled similar antipathy.  Meanwhile, it is hard to say how the Court’s liberals will vote, given the conflicting interests at work.  Time will tell how the dynamic in Gundy plays out but the uncertainty itself provides yet more evidence of the high stakes involved in filling the Court’s current vacancy.  

September 17, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Paul Manafort's DC plea agreement has a calculated guideline range of 17.5 to 22 years (though he can only get 10)

In this post last year following the initial indictment of Paul Manafort in DC District Court on 12 federal criminal counts, I speculated based on the amount of money allegedly involved that Manafort's guideline range, the "starting point and the initial benchmark" for his sentencing, would surely be 10+ years in federal prison.  I have just now had a chance to review a copy of Manafort's plea agreement (first discussed here), and I am intrigued to see that it confirms my (too quick) initial guideline assessment. 

The full Manafort plea agreement is available at this link, and here is the final guideline range assessment: "Based upon the total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth above, the Office calculates your client's estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is 210 months to 262 months' imprisonment."  But, of course, while the guidelines call for a range of 17.5+ years of imprisonment for Manafort, he is only in this agreement pleading guilty to two conspiracy counts that each carry a maximum sentence of five years in prison.  So his prison sentence for the DC case is functionally capped at 10 years (but he could get more, I believe, at his sentencing in his Virginia case where he was convicted on 8 counts following a full trial).

The reality that his guideline range is 17.5+ years but his sentence is functionally capped t 10 years makes this subsequent (boiler plate?) sentence in the Manafort plea agreement intriguing: "Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range (or below) would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal waiver provided below."  

Some prior related posts:

September 17, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (0)

"What Should the Senate Do With Brett Kavanaugh?"

The title of this post is the title of this new Politico piece which has answers/comments from a number of legal academics.  This topic is one surely to roil the legal world this coming week, and the Politico piece sets up why:

In a dramatic turn, Christine Blasey Ford, a professor at Palo Alto University, is accusing Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh of sexually assaulting her when they were in high school in suburban Maryland.  He has categorically denied the allegation, and Republicans are indicating they intend to move ahead with a confirmation vote scheduled for later this week.  Democrats, along with several GOP senators — Jeff Flake of Arizona and Bob Corker of Tennessee — are calling for a pause while the Senate investigates Ford’s story.

I find useful the comment from Ilya Somin to frame some of the criminal law and punishment issues now taking shape as the future of the Supreme Court unfolds.  Here is part of his answer to the question above:

The Judiciary Committee should investigate the matter, and potentially hold additional hearings, and if necessary delay voting on the nomination, as recently suggested by GOP Senator Jeff Flake.  Given that the alleged events in question occurred over 35 years ago, when Kavanaugh was 17 and the accuser 15, getting at the truth may be very difficult, or even impossible.  But the committee should at least try.

What should the standard of proof be?  A Supreme Court confirmation hearing is very different from a criminal trial, where guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Denying a person a lifetime position of vast power on the nation’s highest court is not the same thing as taking away his or her liberty.  It is reasonable to set a lower threshold for the former than the latter.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to put nominees in the position of having to definitively prove that accusations leveled against them are false.  If that becomes the norm, virtually any nomination could be derailed by unsubstantiated accusations concerning alleged wrongdoing that occurred decades ago.  I would thus tentatively suggest that the right standard is that of preponderance of evidence.  If the evidence indicates that it is more likely than not that a Supreme Court nominee is guilty of serious wrongdoing, that should be sufficient to reject the nomination.

There is some merit to the idea that we should discount accusations about long-ago events that occurred when the perpetrator was a minor.  But whether such issues can be ignored completely depends on the seriousness of the charge and the importance of the position for which the person is being considered.  Sexual assault is a serious crime and a seat on the Supreme Court is a position of vast power.

The situation may change radically if other women come forward with plausible accusations of sexual assault or harassment.  Regardless, fair-minded observers should keep an open mind and should encourage the Senate to conduct as unbiased an investigation as possible.  Sadly, that may be too much to expect in this era of poisonous partisan bias.

September 17, 2018 in Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, September 16, 2018

Making the case for a bill to end juve LWOP in the federal system

Marc Levin and Jody Kent Lavy have this new commentary in The Hill under the headline "Sentencing reform is critical for youth in the justice system." Here are excerpts:

As states across the country move to right-size their prison systems, managing to reduce incarceration, costs and crime, it is important to consider reform at the federal level as well.  And when it comes to reforming our sentencing laws, there seems no better place to start than with the most vulnerable among us: our children.  The United States is the only country known to impose life without the possibility of parole on people under the age of 18.

Congressman Bruce Westerman (R-Ark.) took the lead on reform by introducing HR 6011, which would end life-without-parole and de facto life sentences for children in the federal criminal justice system.  Westermanhas been joined by a bipartisan team of co-sponsors — Karen Bass (D-Calif.), Tony Cardenas (D-Calif.) and Lynn Jenkins (R-Kansas) — but other members of Congress must also show their support in this policy rooted in redemption, rehabilitation, and second chances....

Imposing excessive sentences on children ignores what adolescent development research has documented.  And in just the last five years, conservative states like North Dakota, Utah, and Westerman’s native Arkansas have led the way in banning life-without-parole for children.  The Arkansas legislation, now titled Act 539, affects more than 100 people in the state and received broad bipartisan support in the legislature.  Nineteen other states and the District of Columbia prohibit youth from being sentenced to a life in prison with absolutely no hope of re-entering as a productive member of society and no goal to work toward.

Should it pass, HR 6011 would ensure that children sentenced in the federal system have the opportunity to petition a judge to review their sentence after they have served 20 years in prison.  They would then be afforded counsel at each of their review hearings — a maximum of three — where the judge would consider, among other factors, their demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to re-enter society. In other words, this bill does not guarantee release for anyone, but would ensure that children prosecuted and convicted of serious crimes in the federal system are afforded an opportunity to demonstrate whether they are deserving of a second chance.  HR 6011 holds children accountable while providing a reason to pursue self-betterment.  It gives hope to those who would otherwise be staring down a hopeless life sentence without the possibility of a second chance....

We hope other members of Congress will join Congressman Westerman’s bipartisan efforts to create a more fair and just system for our children who are convicted of serious crimes in the federal system.  Mercy is justice, too, and no one is more deserving of our mercy and the opportunity for a second chance than our children.

September 16, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

"A Defense of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Christopher Slobogin now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

In theory, accurate assessments of offender risk can save money, promote efficient allocation of correctional resources, and better protect the public.  In pursuit of these goals, some jurisdictions have begun using structured means of assessing relative risk.  This article briefly describes modern risk assessment instruments, the reasons why they might be preferred over traditional means of assessing risk, and three principles — the fit, validity and fairness principles — that should govern their use.  It then contends that, when limited by these or similar principles, criminal justice dispositions can justifiably be based on assessments of risk, despite concerns about their reliability, consistency and legitimacy.

Inaccuracy and disparity is as prevalent in desert-based sentencing as it is in risk-based sentencing.  More importantly, desert-based sentencing is not as consistent with, and risk-based sentencing is not as inimical to, autonomy and dignity values as is commonly thought.  The overall goal of these arguments is to defend modern risk-based sentencing against abolitionist proposals that could do more harm than good, both to offenders and to a punishment system that, at least in the United States, is obscenely harsh.

September 16, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 15, 2018

"A Reparative Approach to Parole-Release Decisions"

The title of this post is the title of this paper authored by Kristen Bell recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Scholars have argued for enhanced procedural protections at parole hearings, but for the most part without a focus on what substantive criteria ought to guide parole-release decisions.  I undertake this normative project, first describing the approach to parole-release decision criteria from the perspective of four standard theories of punishment: retributive theory, deterrence theory, rehabilitation theory, and communicative theory.  I argue that each of the respective criteria flowing from these theories of punishment is morally objectionable on two grounds: failure to respect the agency of prisoners, and failure to take seriously the limits of our knowledge.  After setting forth these theories and the objections to which they are subject, I turn to draw lessons from how California’s parole-release system functions in practice.

Drawing on both the theoretical and practical perspectives on parole-release criteria, I argue in favor of a fundamental change.  I propose a “reparative approach” that builds on aspects of restorative justice and takes seriously respect for the moral agency of prisoners, victims, and the broader political community.  On this approach, people directly affected by the crime join with others at the outset of a prisoner’s sentence to deliberate and decide upon reasonably achievable criteria that the prisoner would need to meet in order to be released.  At the end of the prisoner’s judicially prescribed period of incarceration, the release decision would then be a ministerial determination of whether the prisoner has in fact met the criteria that were decided upon at the outset.  I leave for future work the question of whether and how such a policy could be implemented in the context of the contemporary American criminal justice system.

September 15, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Reviewing the continued ugly realities of the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act

Running this week at The Appeal is this notable piece with stories and data on the application of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act.  The piece is headlined in full "Man Sentenced As ‘Career Criminal’ Gets His First Chance At Freedom In 48 Years: Despite a 2015 Supreme Court ruling limiting the mandatory minimum law, few people are seeing relief." I recommend the piece in full, and found this data discussion especially interesting:

A run of Supreme Court decisions capped by the 2015 ruling brought relief to some prisoners who were sentenced under ACCA.  The ruling found part of the act to be unconstitutionally vague — it wasn’t clear what qualified a defendant as a “career criminal.” The decision made hundreds of prisoners serving ACCA-enhanced sentences eligible for resentencing.

The Supreme Court limited the prior convictions that qualified a person for sentencing under the act. It did not eliminate prosecutors’ ability to seek ACCA-enhanced sentences, and U.S. attorney’s offices in a handful of jurisdictions continue to regularly use the enhancement against defendants with prior convictions for drug dealing and qualifying violent crimes....

Three years after the Supreme Court decision, prosecutors continue to use ACCA mandatory sentences in patterns that vary significantly from state to state. Whether a defendant faces an ACCA sentence depends on who is prosecuting.  Prosecutors in California won just one ACCA sentence in 2016, while New York had only two prosecutions.  Florida had 61; Missouri had 29 and Tennessee had 26.  Washington state had one ACCA prosecution in 2016.

“It is incredibly arbitrary,” said Molly Gill, vice president for policy at FAMM, an advocacy organization opposed to mandatory sentences.  “One of the ideas behind mandatory minimums … is that they increase the certainty of punishment,” Gill told The Appeal. “When you look at how the law’s applied, that’s really not true.”

Black defendants are far more likely to receive ACCA-enhanced sentences.  According to U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics, 70 percent of defendants sentenced under the act in 2016 were Black.  Whites, who outnumbered Black defendants that year, accounted for 24 percent of ACCA-enhanced sentences.

Severe sentences and mandatory minimums have long been faulted as unnecessary; the U.S. Sentencing Commission found them onerous and inconsistently applied. They also deliver a compelling advantage to prosecutors during negotiations.

Questioning the government during oral arguments in Johnson v. United States, the case that resulted in the 2015 ruling, Chief Justice John Roberts commented that defendants facing a 15-year minimum will take a deal. “You said … because there are so many years involved, people will litigate hard,” Roberts remarked to Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben during the April 2015 hearing.  “I think because there are so many years involved, people won’t litigate at all. … It gives so much more power to the prosecutor in the plea negotiations.”

About 97 percent of defendants convicted in federal court plead guilty prior to trial. Though ACCA sentences have been declining in recent years, 304 people were sentenced under the act in 2016.

September 15, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, September 14, 2018

Reported sentencing details in Paul Manafort's plea deal to wrap up his various federal prosecutions

Politico has this extended article with some of the details of the plea deal completed today between the federal government and Paul Manafort.  Here are excerpts with an emphasis, of course, on sentencing particulars:

President Donald Trump's former campaign chairman Paul Manafort has agreed to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller under a plea agreement revealed Friday. Manafort appeared in a Washington, D.C., courtroom Friday morning, looking relaxed in a suit and purple tie, to formally announce the deal.

The deal dismisses deadlocked charges against Manafort from an earlier trial, but only after "successful cooperation” with Mueller’s probe into Russian election interference and whether the Trump campaign coordinated with Moscow on its efforts. Later, U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson said Manafort is agreeing to "cooperate fully and truthfully" with the investigation.

The agreement also calls for a 10-year cap on how long Manafort will be sent to prison, and for Manafort to serve time from his separate Virginia and Washington cases concurrently.  But it will not release Manafort from jail, where he has been held since Mueller's team added witness tampering charges during the run-up to the longtime lobbyist's trial.

Manafort addressed Jackson in a soft voice, saying “I do” and “I understand” as she asked him whether he understood what rights he’s giving up. “Has anybody forced you, coerced you or threatened you in any way?” she asked later. “No,” Manafort replied, in a barely audible voice. A deputy marshal stood directly behind Manafort, a reminder that he remains in custody.

Legal experts quickly spun the deal as a win for all the parties involved. Manafort gets a potentially shorter sentence and lessens his legal bills. Trump avoids several weeks of bad headlines ahead of the midterm elections about his corrupt former campaign aide. And Mueller — faced with Trump's constant claims that his probe is a witch hunt — gets to show yet again that his charges are not fabricated and can now divert resources to other elements of his Russia probe....

Trump’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani insisted the president and his lawyers were not concerned about Manafort cutting a deal. "Once again an investigation has concluded with a plea having nothing to do with President Trump or the Trump campaign," he said in a statement Friday. "The reason: the President did nothing wrong."

White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders echoed those remarks in her own statement. "This had absolutely nothing to do with the President or his victorious 2016 Presidential campaign," she said. "It is totally unrelated.”

Prosecutors signaled the pending deal Friday morning, filing a new slimmed-down set of charges against Manafort, reining in the felony counts pending against him in D.C. from seven to just two: conspiracy against the U.S. and conspiracy to obstruct justice....

Last month, a jury in Alexandria, Virginia, convicted Manafort on eight felony charges in a tax-and-bank-fraud case also prosecuted by Mueller’s team. The jury deadlocked on 10 other counts, but a verdict form said the jurors were split, 11-1, in favor of conviction on those charges.

Many Trump aides and advisers have said they believe the president is likely to grant Manafort a pardon on all the charges, which Trump has suggested amounted to prosecutorial overkill aimed at persuading Manafort to implicate Trump in wrongdoing in connection with the ongoing Russian investigation.

The charges filed Friday morning came in a criminal information replacing the current indictment in the Washington-based case against Manafort.  The new charges mean that prosecutors have agreed to drop five counts, including money laundering, failing to register as a foreign agent and making false statements. Manafort admitted to those allegations as part of the umbrella conspiracy-against-the-U.S. charge, but the individual charges and the potential prison time they carry are being dismissed.

Weissmann said Manafort is admitting to all of the bank-fraud charges from the Virginia case. While that means Manafort won’t face another trial over those federal charges, the admission could be critical to the issue of follow-up state charges, since bank fraud can typically be charged at the state and federal level.

Without seeing this plea agreement, it is unclear to me whether Manafort now has his sentencing exposure capped at 10 years for all of his convictions or just for those related to the second round of DC charges to which he today pleaded guilty.   I presume the latter, since I am not sure a DC-based plea deal could bind the sentencing discretion of the Virginia-based judge who will be sentencing Manafort on the charges which resulted in jury convictions last month.  The plea agreement could include, however, a representation by federal prosecutors that they will not seek a sentence longer than 10 years in the other part of the case (though I doubt it does).

Of course, the sentencing particulars could become academic if (when?) Prez Trump were to grant Manafort a pardon (which he could do at any time).  As of this writing, I am inclined to predict that Prez Trump will commute Manafort's sentence to reduce how long he spends in prison (rather than grant a full pardon), and do so sometime after the mid-term elections.  We might call this the "Libby treatment" as this is how Prez George Bush used his clemency powers to help our Scotter Libby after his perjury conviction but before he was sent to the federal penitentiary.  (And if Prez Trump was clever and savvy in this arena, he could and would include a commutation for Manafort within a list of dozens or hundreds of other commutations of "regular" offenders.)

September 14, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Laboratories of Democracy: Drug Policy In The United States"

The title of this post is the title of this exciting event taking place in Washington DC later this month that I have had the honor of helping to plan.  Here is the event's description:

Drug use and substance abuse are circumstances that no longer impact only a small percentage of our population. In 2016, over 20 million Americans dealt with a substance use disorder, and the CDC estimates that more than 10 percent of the American population use some form of illegal drug each month. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 58 percent of those in state prisons and 63 percent of those sentenced to state jails meet the medical criteria for drug dependence or abuse.

The Ohio State University’s newly established Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC), with support from the Charles Koch Foundation, will host Laboratories of Democracy: Drug Policy in the United States. This important event will bring together leading academics, members of law enforcement, policymakers, think tank scholars, community advocates, media figures, and other influencers from different spheres and perspectives to discuss the diverse and challenging policy questions that have emerged in the drug policy area.

The event will be held at The Willard InterContinental in Washington, DC on September 25, 2018 from 9:00 am until 3:00 pm. The experts speaking at this event have used their knowledge to propose positive drug policy solutions to tackle the difficult problems faced by our country, and the program will engage attendees in an action-oriented discussion on how our country can move forward with positive solutions to addiction and substance abuse.

More details about and registration for this event (which will include a panel discussion on the opioid crisis and a panel discussion on marijuana reform) are available here and here.  

September 14, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (0)

Marijuana, mandatory minimums and jury nullification, oh my: split Ninth Circuit affirms panel federal convictions, though remands to address DOJ spending rider

A big, long and split decision by a panel of the Ninth Circuit yesterday in US v. Lynch, No. 10-50219 (9th Cir, Sept. 13, 2018) (available here), prompted the weak "Wizard of Oz" reference in the title of this post.  There is so much of interest in Lynch for sentencing fans and others, I cannot cover it all in this post. The majority's introduction provides a sense of the case's coverage:

Charles Lynch ran a marijuana dispensary in Morro Bay, California, in violation of federal law.  He was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and distribute marijuana, as well as other charges related to his ownership of the dispensary.  In this appeal, Lynch contends that the district court made various errors regarding Lynch’s defense of entrapment by estoppel, improperly warned jurors against nullification, and allowed the prosecutors to introduce various evidence tying Lynch to the dispensary’s activities, while excluding allegedly exculpatory evidence offered by Lynch.  However, Lynch suffered no wrongful impairment of his entrapment by estoppel defense, the anti-nullification warning was not coercive, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings were correct in light of the purposes for which the evidence was tendered.  A remand for resentencing is required, though, on the government’s cross-appeal of the district court’s refusal to apply a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, which unavoidably applies to Lynch.

Following the filing of this appeal and after the submission of the government’s brief, the United States Congress enacted an appropriations provision, which this court has interpreted to prohibit the federal prosecution of persons for activities compliant with state medical marijuana laws. Lynch contends that this provision therefore prohibits the United States from continuing to defend Lynch’s conviction.  We need not reach the question of whether the provision operates to annul a properly obtained conviction, however, because a genuine dispute exists as to whether Lynch’s activities were actually legal under California state law. Remand will permit the district court to make findings regarding whether Lynch complied with state law.

Judge Watford dissented from the panel majority in Lynch, and his dissent starts this way:

I would reverse and remand for a new trial. In my view, the district court went too far in trying to dissuade the jury from engaging in nullification.  The court’s actions violated Charles Lynch’s constitutional right to trial by jury, and the government can’t show that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

By its very nature, a case of this sort touches a sensitive nerve from a federalism standpoint.  At the time of Lynch’s trial in 2008, the citizens of California had legalized the sale and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes; the federal government nonetheless sought to prosecute a California citizen for conduct that arguably was authorized under state law. Because federal law takes precedence under the Supremacy Clause, the government could certainly bring such a prosecution, notwithstanding the resulting intrusion upon state sovereignty interests.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).  But the Framers of the Constitution included two provisions that act as a check on the national government’s exercise of power in this realm: one stating that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury”; the other requiring that “such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  The Sixth Amendment further mandates that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”  Thus, to send Lynch to prison, the government had to persuade a jury composed of his fellow Californians to convict.

One of the fundamental attributes of trial by jury in our legal system is the power of the jury to engage in nullification — to return a verdict of not guilty “in the teeth of both law and facts.” Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).  The jury’s power to nullify has ancient roots, dating back to pre-colonial England.  See Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200–1800, at 236–49 (1985) (discussing Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670)).  It became a well-established fixture of jury trials in colonial America, perhaps most famously in the case of John Peter Zenger, a publisher in New York acquitted of charges of seditious libel.  See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 871–74 (1994).  From ratification of the Constitution to the present, the right to trial by jury has been regarded as “essential for preventing miscarriages of justice,” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968), in part because the jury’s power to nullify allows it to act as “the conscience of the community,” Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 87 (1994).

Cross-posted at Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform.

September 14, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Pot Prohibition Issues, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 13, 2018

"Can We Downsize Our Prisons and Jails Without Compromising Public Safety? Findings from California's Prop 47"

The title of this post is the title of this new article in Criminology & Public Policy authored by Bradley Bartos and Charis Kubrin. Here is its abstract:

Research Summary

Our study represents the first effort to evaluate systematically Proposition 47's (Prop 47's) impact on California's crime rates.  With a state‐level panel containing violent and property offenses from 1970 through 2015, we employ a synthetic control group design to approximate California's crime rates had Prop 47 not been enacted.  Our findings suggest that Prop 47 had no effect on homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, or burglary.  Larceny and motor vehicle thefts, however, seem to have increased moderately after Prop 47, but these results were both sensitive to alternative specifications of our synthetic control group and small enough that placebo testing cannot rule out spuriousness.

Policy Implications

As the United States engages in renewed debates regarding the scale and cost of its incarcerated population, California stands at the forefront of criminal justice reform.  Although California reduced its prison population by 13,000 through Prop 47, critics argue anecdotally that the measure is responsible for recent crime upticks across the state.  We find little empirical support for these claims. Thus, our findings suggest that California can downsize its prisons and jails without compromising public safety.

The authored of this research also have this new commentary in Governing headlined "The Myth That Crime Rises as Prisons Shrink: California's dramatic reduction in its prison populations hasn't compromised public safety." Here is an excerpt:

Approved by the voters in 2014, Prop 47 was controversial from the start. It downgraded the lowest-level non-violent drug and petty-theft crimes from felonies to misdemeanors. Critics warned that the measure would embolden would-be criminals as felony arrests throughout the state plummeted.  After Prop 47 went into effect in 2014, lowering prison populations by 13,000, that controversy only escalated.  Soon law-enforcement officials were calling for the measure to be repealed.  They blamed rising crime rates on Prop 47.

But the science doesn't support the assertion that Prop 47 is to blame. We recently published a study that was the first effort to systematically evaluate Prop 47's impact on crime in California.  Our research found that the proposition had no appreciable impact on crime in the year following its enactment.

September 13, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, National and State Crime Data, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)

Various federal, state and local perspectives on the latest fronts in the latest battles of the never-ending drug war

As noted in this prior post, the new Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC) at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a lot of programming and resources already assembled on the interesting and intricate drug sentencing and prison reform initiative headed for the November 2018 ballot here in Ohio called the "Neighborhood Safety, Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Amendment" or just Issue 1.  In particular today, Thursday, September 13 at 12noon, starts a series five public panels about Issue 1 under the title Ballot Insights (and DEPC has also created a Resources Page for Issue 1 and Commentary Page on Issue 1).  I find Issue 1 fascinating because the players involved and perspectives shared on drug enforcement and drug policy amidst a state-wide direct democracy campaign is already proving remarkable (e.g., Ohio judges have been very vocal so far fiercely opposing Issue 1's drug sentencing reforms). 

Meanwhile, this week also brought an interesting local perspective (mostly from Ohio) on another front of the drug war in the form of this very lengthy piece by Jack Shuler in The New Republic titled "Overdose and Punishment." The sub title of the piece highlights its themes: "When Chad Baker died from a lethal combination of cocaine and heroin, prosecutors charged Tommy Kosto, his friend and fellow drug user, with killing him — a tactic from the Reagan-era war on drugs that is gaining popularity around the country and making today's opioid crisis even worse."

Providing yet another perspective on these matters is Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who yesterday delivered this speech to the National Narcotics Officers' Association’s Coalition Drug Enforcement Forum.  Those who regularly read the AG's speeches will find a lot in this latest speech familiar, but I still though it useful to reprint some of his discussion of the drug war "surge" now on-going at the federal level:

[I]n the districts where drug deaths are the highest, we are now vigorously prosecuting synthetic opioid trafficking cases, even when the amount is small. It’s called Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge — or S.O.S.

We are in a desperate fight to curtail the availability and spread of this killer drug. Synthetic opioids are so strong that there is no such thing as a small case. Three milligrams of fentanyl can be fatal. That’s equivalent to a pinch of salt. Depending on the purity, you could fit more than 1,000 fatal doses of fentanyl in a teaspoon.

I want to be clear about this: we are not focusing on users, but on those supplying them with deadly drugs.

In Manatee County, Florida, in partnership with the Sheriff, we tried this strategy and it worked. This past January, they had half the number of overdose deaths as the previous January. The Manatee County Sheriff’s Office went from responding to 11 overdose calls a day to an average of one a day. Those are promising results. We want to replicate those results in the places that have been hardest hit.

And so I have also sent 10 more prosecutors to help implement this strategy in ten districts where drug deaths are especially high. And that is in addition to the 12 prosecutors I sent to prosecute opioid fraud in drug “hot spot districts.” To help them do that, I have begun a new data analytics program at the Department called the Opioid Fraud and Abuse Detection Unit to use data to find opioid-related health care fraud....

I have also sent more than 300 new federal prosecutors to our U.S. Attorneys offices across America. This is the largest surge in prosecutors in decades. You can be sure drugs, gangs, and related violence will be a priority for them.

September 13, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, September 12, 2018

As Booker enters its adolescence, do we really know much of substance about substantive reasonableness review?

The question in the title of this post is prompted in part by a couple of recent reasonableness rulings from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits that seemed noteworthy: in US v. Heard, No. 17-3062 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2018) (available here), a split Sixth Circuit panel upholds an above-guideline sentences over a spirited dissent in firearm cases; in US v. Staples, No. 17-2068 (10th Cir. Aug 27, 2018)  (available here), a unanimous Tenth Circuit panel reverses a below-guideline sentences in a fraud case.  These decisions reflect one feature of nearly all criminal appeals, namely that the government wins and the defendant loses.  But I was inspired to pose the question in the title of this post because these these decisions also reinforce my sense that, even 13 years into the post-Booker world, there is still very little jurisprudential substance to substantive reasonableness review.  These decisions represent data points, but not much more.

In this post some months ago, I provided a string cite of commentary  documenting the mess that reasonableness review has become in the circuits.   I will provide this list again in part because it support my belief that federal sentencing law and practice would benefit significantly from the Supreme Court's further engagement with reasonableness review.  See, e.g.,  Carrie Leonetti, De Facto Mandatory: A Quantitative Assessment Of Reasonableness Review After Booker, 66 DePaul L. Rev. 51 (2016) (lamenting disparate circuit approaches to reasonableness review creating a “patchwork of guideline sentencing in which defendants’ sentences are dictated more by the happenstance of geography than by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence”); Note, More Than a Formality: The Case for Meaningful Substantive Reasonableness Review, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 951 (2014) (discussing a “number of notable circuit splits” concerning reasonableness review); D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49 Duq. L. Rev. 641, 649-61 (2011) (noting that “the courts of appeals have differed over how to apply the [reasonableness] standard” and “have split on several important legal questions”).

As long-time readers know, I used to regularly report on circuit reasonableness rulings in the years after Booker and the follow up cases of RitaGall and Kimbrough.  But now I barely notice these cases and rarely report on them, because there seems to me little significance in individual data points absent broader jurisprudential developments.  But maybe I am missing something, and thus the question here posed.

September 12, 2018 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Booker in the Circuits, Gall reasonableness case, Kimbrough reasonableness case, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Florida felony disenfranchisement ugliness getting a lot more scrutiny thanks to John Oliver

John-oliver-discusses-felony-disThis local article, headlined "This HBO comedian ridiculed Florida’s clemency process. Rick Scott takes it seriously," reports on notable developments in Florida thanks in part to a low-profile issue getting some high-profile attention.  Here are excerpts:

For only the third time this year — but this time under a withering national media glare — Florida’s highest elected officials sat in judgment Tuesday of people whose mistakes cost them the right to vote.

During a five-hour hearing, 90 felons made their case to Florida Gov. Rick Scott and three members of the Cabinet, asking to have their rights restored. It was a packed house in the Cabinet room of the state Capitol, as Tuesday’s hearing drew reporters and cameras from, among other outlets, NPR, The Huffington Post and The Guardian. The hearings typically attract one or two members of the Tallahassee press corps.

Only two days before, Florida’s restoration of rights process was skewered on national TV by John Oliver of HBO’s “Last Week Tonight.” He devoted a 13-minute segment to the Florida clemency system, calling it “absolutely insane” and mocking Scott for creating “the disenfranchisement capital of America.”

Under a policy struck down by a federal judge that remains in effect while Scott and the state appeal, anyone with a felony conviction in Florida must wait five years before petitioning the state to regain the right to vote, serve on a jury or possess a firearm.

Florida has an estimated 1.5 million felons who have been permanently stripped of the right to vote, far more than any other state. To get their rights restored, they must formally apply to make an appeal before Scott and the Cabinet, which is now composed of Attorney General Pam Bondi, Agriculture Commissioner Adam Putnam and Chief Financial Officer Jimmy Patronis....

Voters will have a chance to overhaul the restoration system before Scott and the three Cabinet members are scheduled to hold their next clemency hearing on Dec. 5. A month before then, on Nov. 6, voters will decide on Amendment 4 that would restore the right to vote to most felons after they complete their sentences, if 60 percent of voters approve....

The five-year waiting period was implemented by Scott, Bondi, Putnam and another Cabinet member after their election in 2010. A statewide petition drive collected nearly 1 million signatures to get Amendment 4 before voters this fall.

Scott, the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate against Democrat Bill Nelson, supports the existing system. With his approval, the state is now appealing U.S. District Court Judge Mark Walker’s decision to strike down the rights restoration system as arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Amendment 4 does not distinguish between violent and non-violent felons, but people convicted of murder and sex crimes would not be eligible to regain their rights if it passes. A political committee that supports the amendment, Floridians for a Fair Democracy based in Clearwater, spent $3.579 million in the week ending Aug. 31, with nearly all of the money spent on a “media buy,” which likely means TV advertising. The group has raised $14.4 million so far with large contributions from a number of wealthy out-of-state individuals and from the American Civil Liberties Union.

The permanent elimination of civil rights to felons has been in effect in the state for more than a century, under Republican and Democratic governors, and was lifted only during the four-year term of Charlie Crist, from 2007 to 2011, when 155,315 offenders who were released had their rights restored. Under Scott, only about 4,350 offenders have had their rights restored.

The full John Oliver segment, which is gets especially interested toward the end, is available at this link.

Some (of many) prior related posts:

September 12, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Misdemeanor Records and Employment Outcomes: An Experimental Study"

The title of this post is the title of this new empirical research available via SSRN and authored by Peter Leasure. Here is its abstract:

Objectives:  This study examined whether misdemeanor drug convictions impact entry-level employment outcomes.

Methods:  A multifactor between subjects correspondence design was used whereby fictitious resumes are sent to employers.  Resumes were randomly assigned to one of three groups: no criminal record, one-year-old misdemeanor record, and a one-year-old felony record.  Resumes were also randomly assigned with a distinctively White or African American name. Job type was used as an additional predictor.

Results:  Results indicate that a misdemeanor conviction significantly hinders early employment outcomes for both African American and White applicants.  However, results did not show statistically significant differences in callbacks between races.

Conclusions:  These results should be utilized to better inform defendants, practitioners, and policy-makers on the negative impacts of low-level convictions.

September 12, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Kelley Ashby Paul, Senator Rand Paul's spouse, makes the Kentucky case for criminal justice reform

Long-time readers know I have been singing the praises of Senator Rand Paul since he began making the case for consequential federal sentencing reforms more than half a decade ago.  Now I am pleased to see that Senator Paul's spouse, Kelley Ashby Paul, is adding her voice to the call for reform through this new op-ed headlined "Kelley Paul: We must focus on recovery, not incarceration."  Here are excerpts:

As a community, as a state and as a nation, we must speak out in favor of expanded rehabilitation opportunities for those struggling with addiction. Because of the Hope Center’s expansion, even more women ... will have the tools to overcome addiction and begin a new path forward in life.

It is recovery, not incarceration, which allows people to become productive members of society — citizens with jobs and families who can contribute and make our communities better places to work, grow and live. It is recovery, not incarceration, which brings hope and peace into the lives of thousands of Americans and their families struggling with addiction.

The Hope Center expansion comes on the heels of the enactment of the first ever Dignity Bill in the nation, right here in Kentucky.  Because of Sen. Julie Raque Adams’ sponsorship of the bill, and the tenacity of women leaders on both sides of the aisle, pregnant women accused of minor, non-violent crimes now have the option to enter into a recovery program. They can get the treatment they need, instead of languishing behind bars because they are unable to make bail.

Criminal-justice reform is something my husband, U.S. Sen. Rand Paul, has been fighting for since he arrived in Washington. He is a lead co-sponsor of bipartisan bail reform legislation with Sen. Kamala Harris, and with the recent introduction of the First Step Act, a major bipartisan prison reform bill that includes expanded treatment opportunities, I am hopeful we can continue our efforts to fix a broken system.  I am proud to assure the people of this commonwealth that my family will do everything we can to ensure that the First Step Act will get a vote.

Criminal-justice reform goes hand in hand with reducing homelessness, alcoholism and drug addiction.  We have learned that locking people up who are in need of treatment is not the answer.

The U.S. is the most heavily incarcerated country in the developed world, and many of those incarcerated have suffered a trauma, such as sexual or physical abuse, which led to addiction, and ultimately led them to our justice system. Instead of treating these individuals, we toss them behind bars, where their problems only get worse.  This cycle of failure results in staggering financial costs to the taxpayer, but more importantly a devastating cost to families and children.

I suspect that most folks in the Commonwealth of Kentucky are in support of the kinds of criminal justice reforms here promoted by Kelley Paul, and the state's Governor has been an outspoken reform advocate. But when it comes to getting votes on significant federal criminal justice bills, the most important person from Kentucky is Senate Majority Leader Mitchell McConnell Jr. He decides whether any bill gets a full Senate vote and he has not allowed a floor vote on any significant criminal justice reform bill during his leadership. I hope that changes soon, and maybe Kelley Paul can have more influence on this front than seemingly her spouse has so far.

September 12, 2018 in Aspects and impact of Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 11, 2018

A terrific partial unpacking of "Johnson v. United States: Three years out"

I noted in posts here and here last month, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Senators Orrin Hatch and Tom Cotton are talking up the need for reform to the Armed Career Criminal Act in response to the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Johnson v. US.   I just now noticed that Andrew Hamm has this lengthy follow-up post at SCOTUSblog under the title "Johnson v. United States: Three years out."  I recommend that post in full, and here is a flavor:

After the decision in Johnson, individuals sentenced under ACCA’s now-defunct residual clause filed petitions for collateral review, a procedure that allows prisoners, within certain constraints, to ask a court to amend their sentences.  Additional follow-on litigation to Johnson has involved questions about other aspects of ACCA’s “violent felony” definition, as in next term’s United States v. Stitt, as well as vagueness challenges to definitions of “violent felony” in other statutes, as in last term’s Sessions v. Dimaya.

But even as these and other challenges play out in the courts, Johnson’s real-world consequences in the three years since the case was decided raise other questions about recidivism, re-entry and policy.  For example, have people sentenced as career offenders and released early after Johnson gone on to commit more crimes?  If some have, are certain, less vague sentence enhancements — as Sessions has recommended and as new legislation introduced by two Republican senators would impose — the proper “fix” to Johnson?  This post looks at some of the different factors at play....

Earlier this month, two Republican senators, Orrin Hatch of Utah and Tom Cotton of Arkansas, introduced the Restoring the Armed Career Criminal Act to, as they wrote in an op-ed for the Washington Examiner, “fix the law that was struck down.” In their press releases announcing the proposed legislation, Hatch and Cotton mentioned victims in their states whom Sessions also discussed.  According to a one-pager about the legislation, the act “would do away with the concepts of ‘violent felony’ and ‘serious drug offense’ and replace them with a single category of ‘serious felony.’ A serious felony would be any crime punishable by 10 years or more.”

Brian Colas, Cotton’s general counsel, and Baron-Evans agree that this new legislation would avoid the vagueness problems of the original ACCA residual clause.  They disagree on how broadly the law would sweep.  Whereas Colas points to the fact the crimes must be punishable by 10 years or more, which he takes as a proxy for the high seriousness of an offense, Baron-Evans worries about the many people regularly sentenced to less than 10 years but for whom 10 years or more would represent a statutory maximum.

Raghavan suggests that subjecting drug offenders to the same sentencing enhancement as violent offenders may not be warranted based on recidivism rates. In its 2016 report on people sentenced as career offenders, the Sentencing Commission split individuals into three categories: career offenders with only drug-trafficking offenses, those with only violent offenses, and those with mixed offenses.  People sentenced as career offenders with only drug-trafficking offenses had a lower recidivism rate than those in the other categories. Among those who did recidivate, those with only drug-trafficking offenses “tended to take longer to do so” than those in the other categories. Additionally, “offenders in the other two pathways who were rearrested were more likely to have been rearrested for another violent offense” than offenders with only drug-trafficking offenses.

The next step for the legislation is the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Colas estimates that it will take six to eight months for this legislation to get through the committee. He notes that the act will be absorbed into a “broader fight” for criminal justice reform in Congress. 

This post provides a clear and balanced review of data and the state of the debate over one proposed ACCA fix in the wake of Johnson.  But I call the post only a "partial unpacking" of the post-Johnson landscape because it does not address whether and how federal ACCA charging practices have changed after Johnson and/or whether it might be especially sound to just give judges more sentencing discretion in response to an array of ACCA problems.

The reason Johnson in particular, and ACCA in general, is so consequential and the subject of so much litigation is because ACCA's intricate and vague rules about predicate offenses turn a regulatory crime (possessing a firearm as a felon) with normally only a 10-year maximum sentence into a mega-crime with a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.  Rather than dicker excessively over the particulars of the rules for qualifying predicates in future ACCA debates, it might make a lot more sentence to just raise the normal maximum to, say, 15 years and also lower the ACCA minimum to, say, 5 years.  By so doing, persons with priors that might or might not qualify for ACCA treatment still could be sentenced under (advisory) guidelines in the 5-to-15-year range without a need to litigate all the particulars of all the priors.  Just a thought for would-be staffers looking forward to "six to eight months" of ACCA debates.

Prior related posts:

September 11, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)